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Introduction 
Concerns about the climate are not new to the twentieth and twenty-first century. 
Historians have highlighted the ways in which populations have been governed to live 
with, work in and manage different kinds of climates (e.g. see Fleming and Jankovic 
2011). Yet the concept of ‘global climate change’ has become undoubtedly powerful 
in the latter half of the twentieth century and has been adopted in diverse calls for 
societal intervention in the name of defending sound science, a stable climate and 
enhancing sustainability. The contributions in this book illustrate the diverse 
mechanisms, practices, discourses and rationalities of policy interventions to govern 
for and through the global climate. While there is a substantive policy literature 
exploring these topics, the contributions here provide innovative and conceptually 
convincing demonstrations of the value of Foucauldian governmentality approaches 
(on their own or in co-ordination with other conceptual frames) to understanding 
climate governance.  
 
Authors in this volume explore climate governance in diverse ways, for example as 
processes of rationalisation and calculation (chapter 10), global visions (chapter 4 and 
chapter 12), post-political neoliberal rationality (chapter 3) and new experiments, 
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whether with urban form (chapter 2) or the everyday use of energy (chapter 7). They 
raise important questions such as how climates, forests and energy meters are 
conceptualized, modelled and categorized for the purposes of climate governance. 
They also reflect the ways that subjects are constructed through these processes and 
the various effects of these new modes of governance and self-governance. Climate 
governance is thus about governing climate, governing with and through climate, 
governing sets of practices that are tied to climate change through temporally and 
spatially specific associations of actors, and governing populations as climate citizens 
or subjects. There are thus many forms of climate governance being discussed, which 
raises an important question. Do these represent different facets of a political form or 
different kinds of interventions and experimentation in practice? 
 
This question is taken as the challenge to be explored in my contribution. Blok 
(chapter 2) suggests that there are ‘multiple climatic problems’ and presents a series 
of problematizations, interdependent areas in which a problem becomes delineated 
and made potentially resolvable, but which do not encompass nor accrue to a form of 
totalizing climate change governance. Given this, however, the question is how 
climate change becomes tied to these sets of practices and whether what emerges is 
thus climate change multiple. Here I draw from Mol’s (2002) work on the body in 
medical practice, which suggests that the variety of practices regarding atherosclerosis 
re-makes the body and disease not as a singular entity neither as pluralist bodies. Mol 
(2002) rather suggests ‘the body multiple’ – more than one, less than many. She 
delinks the question of what to do from the question of what is real, and that this 
politics-of-what must ‘assume that the end points of trials, the goals sought for, are 
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political in character’ (Mol 2002: 175). Politics opens up questions rather than solving 
them through facts or argument. The question is where is the political here? 
 
While governmentality perspectives may be aligned methodologically with actor-
network theory, as most clearly shown in Whitehead (2009), there is still a question 
about the theorization of the political therein. As Blok (2011) points out, some of the 
performativity approaches within science and technology studies have failed to 
articulate a suitable theory of the political that is actually amenable with actor-
network concepts. Is there a role for governmentality here or would this, as Blok 
suggests, then undermine precisely what is distinctive about actor-network 
approaches? Remaining agnostic on this question for the present time, here I want to 
explore this question through the different ways in which climate change is enacted in 
the governance practices identified in previous chapters. In particular, there are three 
primary forms of climate change enrolled in these practices, namely ones that focus 
on security, individualization and economics. These overlap in some ways and 
diverge in other ways, and the ways these practices rub up against each other are 
particularly informative. To illustrate that these practices re-order climates and 
populations, the following sections provide necessarily short examples of these three 
diverse enactments of climate change, before moving on to a broader reflection on the 
question of climate governance in the conclusion. 
 
Climate change security  
Climate change has been enacted as a security risk through assemblages of security 
officials, risk models and the legitimating power of rhetoric of threat that has been re-
invigorated since 9-11. For all this seeming authority, however, as Oels (chapter 11) 
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suggests, there has been rather less in the way of dramatic interventions than might be 
expected from climate change as exceptional state, and rather more adaptive, market-
oriented governance that enables a de-politicized resilience mantra to become 
established. It is nonetheless clear that security practices shape the object of climate 
change in a particular way that stresses potential non-linearity and a requirement for 
continual vigilance and monitoring of unsettled peoples and ecosystems. Monitoring 
movement, as Fall (chapter 9) suggests, becomes a key organizing principle for these 
emerging forms of climate security governance. 
 
Governments are not only anticipating potential worst-case scenarios but also actively 
imagining a phantasmagoria that becomes real (de Goede and Randalls 2009). 
Examples include the collections of pictures of future scenarios of climate change 
(London under floods, or in tropical conditions, or completely iced over), the classic 
disaster film imaginary of immediate climatic cataclysm (most well known in The 
Day After Tomorrow), and the prospect of geoengineering to deliberately alter the 
global climate. In the case of biodiversity changes, the lists of (invasive) species 
works both to confirm particular species as threats as well as to legitimate managerial 
interventions to confine or restrict the spread of these invasive species in the name of 
enhancing biosecurity. As de Goede (2012) illustrates in the case of terrorist finance 
these lists then become performative. Being added to a list literally turns that person 
or organization into a risk and defines and restricts the future circulations of finance. 
In climate change governance, particular places and populations become risky: the 
North African and Middle Eastern water-deprived areas that might foster Islamic 
radicalism or the Bangladeshi migrants fleeing rising waters into neighbouring India. 
Climate threats become defined through scientific modelling – indeed it is interesting 
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that in climate-health research, while South East Asian countries are predicted to have 
deaths from malnutrition the European Union is not, primarily because of an 
assumption that the European Union will supply food to all its member states whereas 
the South East Asian countries will be less co-operative with each other (Randalls 
2011).  
 
Climate change is not a neutral scientific script that lends authority to policy-makers 
to establish governance interventions vis-à-vis a global climate polity. Rather climate 
change is always already a co-produced science-political hybrid and as such is 
enacted in particular ways by different assemblages of practices. The good outcome is 
a world secured from climate change (impacts), but that does not necessarily mean 
interventions to prevent climate change. Subjects that are compensated through 
insurance mechanisms for climate change impacts are an equally important outcome 
of securitization (Stripple 2012). Thus climate change security is both multiple and 
constitutes multiple subjects (Stripple 2012). 
 
Individualization  
For other groups, climate change is primarily an issue of responsibility and 
consumption, with citizens needing to take the lead to encourage carbon-friendly 
resourcing of required goods and services. This is implemented through a variety of 
engagements with consumers from carbon calculators (chapter 6), to energy smart 
meters (chapter 7) and through to interventions to ‘nudge’ people to make ‘correct’ 
decisions (chapter 5). This approach is characterized by an individualization of 
responsibility, an attitude of self-governance and a concerned subject that never 
knows if they have done enough to stave off climate disaster. 
 6 
 
Hargreaves (chapter 7) provides a particularly in-depth exploration of the use of smart 
meters in households. Here one learns that rather than technologies simply delivering 
emissions reductions, they play more complicated and nuanced roles in lifestyles. As 
Mol (2008: 58) writes: ‘technologies do not subject themselves to what we wish them 
to do, but interfere with who we are.’ Smart meters enact a particular kind of climate-
concerned subject, which enacts climate change as a phenomenon that is to be 
managed through reductions in carbon usage and guilt. Climate change here is less the 
dramatic security personae and more a day-to-day practice, an attention to the ways in 
which consumers in richer countries (at least) manage their lives in the expectation 
that changes can and will be made to deliver a less carbon-intensive lifestyle 
(Paterson and Stripple 2010). If marketized in the form of personal carbon trading, 
where each individual would have a carbon allowance and then buy/sell their credits 
as required, then this equally rewards those that can competently economically 
manage carbon. The marketplace resolves individual choices by putting a market 
price on carbon and letting consumers decide how they wish to spend their portion of 
the atmospheric pie. 
 
Again, this is not a neutral threat of climate change and one of many options to 
resolve the problem. In this case, climate change is modelled and counted by 
establishing ‘carbon equivalency’ as the commodity that is to be managed to save the 
planet. Climate change is enacted as a problem of carbon management, legitimating 
interventions into better governing the use of carbon in people’s lives. The good 
outcome here is the rational, carbon consumer, who will enable the reduction of 
carbon-dioxide emissions to prevent climate change.  
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Economic agenda  
Similar to the individualization focus, the practice of using economic instruments, 
especially markets, as the primary governance mechanism for climate change narrows 
the scope of action to ‘carbon dioxide equivalent’, valuing and pricing this new 
commodity. Here, though, rather than individuals being entrusted to govern 
themselves, the focus is much more on the producers of emissions rather than the 
consumers. Of necessity, the introduction of carbon markets requires strong state 
involvement. This is no laissez-faire approach, but rather one that is characterized by 
scientific authorities and legislators working together to measure, monitor and map 
carbon production and absorption for the purposes of establishing mechanisms of 
trade that, according to their stated objectives, enable the overall reduction in 
emissions. Good examples of this are the REDD+ schemes for rewarding the 
prevention of destruction to forests as well as the creation of new forests (chapter 10 
and chapter 3) and feed-in tariffs to enable renewable energy development (chapter 
8). 
 
The case of forestry governance through carbon markets illustrates the considerable 
expansion of a new economic sector, carbon, which relies on carbon market 
professionals as sources of authority and expertise, and establishes financial circuits 
as ideal modes of governance. As Lovell (chapter 10) notes, this connects a whole set 
of scientific expertise in remote sensing and carbon science with the informational 
needs of a market. Climate change is here enacted as a financial problematic, defining 
a new commodity and set of trading relationships to stabilize the object, climate 
change, as something amenable and solvable through market relations. Rather than 
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presenting an irruptive threat to the market, climate change comes to be governed 
through the market. One can associate such practices with discourses such as cost-
effectiveness, externalities, optimal policies, and a belief in the market as primary 
information processor.  
 
For Methmann, Rothe and Stephan (chapter 3), these micro-practices of carbon 
governance through commoditization, are allied to broader power relations that re-
inscribe forms of neoliberal governmentality that, like the security network described 
earlier, depoliticizes debates about climate change. At the same time, however, this 
market-based approach is but one enactment of climate change circulating at present, 
albeit a particularly dominating one if the focus is on international policy. This 
economic agenda has at its core a stated goal of achieving emissions reductions at the 
lowest possible cost, but its goals seem to be as much about achieving some kind of 
economic rationality that incorporates and resolves external critique, as it is about 
managing climate change. While even the most dedicated carbon market enthusiasts 
agree that changes are needed if markets are to achieve emissions reductions, there 
still remains a faith that given the right conditions markets will eventually deliver on 
this promise. Paterson and Stripple (2012) deploy the term ‘virtuous carbon’ to 
emphasize the ways in which virtuality and morality are entwined in carbon markets 
such that the moral goodness of carbon trading to ‘save the planet’ outweighs specific 
critiques of market failures. If climate change represented such an imminent threat (as 
the security network might suggest), then carbon markets hardly appear an ideal 
solution in terms of time-scale. 
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Conclusions 
The usefulness of the concepts from governmentality analyses for understanding 
contemporary climate governance has been established in previous chapters, but it is 
clear that different authors are interpreting and reading these interventions in different 
ways. Do these micro-practices of governance totalize into a neoliberal 
governmentality or are there just too many differences to allow for hegemony? Blok 
(chapter 2) suggests that rather than a global polity there is a meshwork of assemblies-
in-the-making. I would concur with this conclusion, but it is nonetheless important to 
stress that these assemblies always re-make things and the way they are re-made is not 
neutral. Death (chapter 4), like Blok, would critique a governmentality approach that 
adopts a global ‘programmer’s view’, but nevertheless retains the value of charting 
particular analytical frames that are observed in climate governance. Some 
interventions share very strong commonalities with themes and discourses that appear 
rather similar to those developed in the neoliberal thought collective as outlined by 
Mirowski (2009) e.g. the redefinition rather than the removal of the state, the market 
as the natural and most advanced information processor and solution to any perceived 
market problems, and the recoding of freedom as autonomous self-governance. At the 
same time, there is no singular neoliberal narrative on climate change: promoting 
scepticism and carbon markets is not exactly a consistent position. So to call 
something neoliberal should not necessarily be to appeal to a structural determinant 
that defines the analysis, but rather to call attention to specific practices that bear 
remarkable similarities to stated neoliberal thinkers’ philosophies. 
 
Each of the three sets of practices or assemblages identified earlier in this chapter can 
and do share some neoliberal tropes, most evidently in the carbon commodity 
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interventions and perhaps less so in the security network, notwithstanding the power 
this has for geoengineering. Fundamentally, however, these practices do not seem to 
be different solutions to the same problem – climate change – but rather function as 
different ways of thinking, writing, doing, practicing and enacting climate change. In 
other words, climate change is not a singular entity that is then made governable in 
different ways; rather climate change is inherently multiply constituted through 
different assemblages of people, organizations, ecologies and much more. To 
demonstrate this more empirically, the good outcome for the market-oriented 
strategies of a cost-effective climate change is not necessarily consistent with the need 
to secure populations and ecologies from climatic harm. Likewise geoengineering 
interventions to secure the planet seem to demobilize the need and legitimacy of 
interventions in everyday lives and practices to reduce emissions. These goals and 
objectives are not simply commensurable with each other. Yet they are held together 
in tension, or with frictions, by the ways they conflict materially and discursively with 
each other. As such, solving climate change cannot just be about reducing carbon 
emissions. 
 
The good outcomes of climate policies therefore are different and may be conflictual, 
even within the same policy intervention. In forests around the world, for example, 
the goal of reducing carbon emissions through REDD+ schemes or in mitigating 
pollution through carbon offsets creates significant new economic incentives to plant 
trees (chapter 10 and chapter 3). Inasmuch as this might be a rational solution to 
reducing carbon equivalent concentrations in the atmosphere; and it might be 
ecologically good if one considers that more trees may enhance biodiversity; and it 
might be socially good if local populations are provided with necessary means to 
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manage the trees; there are serious criticisms. Monocultures may not enhance 
biodiversity. Contracts with local populations may privatize land in ways that function 
to exclude previous users of lands from damaging controlled carbon sinks (the 
national park scenario in conservation). Carbon offsets may simply function to enable 
people to continue with their lifestyles paying a small charge to repair the damage, 
which might not ever be realized in measurable emission reductions. Each climate 
assemblage, therefore, portrays certain goods that are sought for, while obscuring 
others that are considered negative, while in different assemblages the goods and bads 
might be reversed. What do we make of this in terms of governmentality (some 
questions) and policy (some responses)? 
 
First in terms of academic literatures, it asks researchers to consider how emerging 
issues are enacted as part of new forms of governance mechanisms and prompts us to 
question why some seem to become dominant and others much less visible. So an 
important question is: how are goods enrolled within particular networks as the 
central concern while other goods are marginalized? It is hard to critique particular 
governmental interventions as enforcing post-political frames when it is so difficult to 
construct a viable alternative, especially when any alternative (socialism maybe?) can 
be caricatured as having its own set of sought-for goods that are not democratically 
agreed upon. On the other hand, actor-network theorists appear more amenable to 
contemporary governance interests in showing how things work, for example, in 
financial markets. What, then, are the politics of our critiques? A second important 
question for governmentality and actor-network scholars is how to deal with 
similarities and uniqueness across different fields. The literature on climate 
governmentality has emerged alongside environmental literatures on forestry and 
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biodiversity, also exploring similar themes of calculation, self-governance, 
exclusion/inclusion, and marketization. As such it seems incongruous to think that 
climate interventions are unique. How is it that assemblies-in-the-making (chapter 2) 
formulate and derive ideas and legitimation from other assemblies-in-the-making? 
Why do certain forms of governance persist from issue-to-issue, or good sought-to-
good sought, while others are challenged and may fail? 
 
Second in terms of policy, this multiplicity opens up new questions and challenges in 
decision-making. There can be no simple way of ‘communicating’ climate change to 
engender particular forms of climate actions, as there is no singular climate change 
that crosses diverse sets of climate associations in practice. This focus forces us to 
consider climate policies as being multiple interventions that have as their goal 
different kinds of goods to be achieved that are not mere choices for us to decide 
between: shall we take the economic good or the security good? It is not that simple. 
As Mol (2002: 184) puts it ‘Presenting the body multiple [climate change multiple] as 
the reality we live with is not a solution to a problem, but a way of changing a host of 
intellectual reflexes.’ The classical conception of solving climate change through 
emissions reduction is opened up to a broader political problematic that considers the 
good outcome to be achieved. Even within this frame, the coalescing of political focus 
on preventing a global mean average temperature increase of 2°C above pre-industrial 
temperatures has struggled at times to legitimate this goal as well as prove how it is 
even deliverable in emission changes. It is a fixation on a statistical outcome rather 
than considering a multiplicity of goods: quality of life; quality of ecosystems; types 
of interventions; and political questions about what kinds of freedoms we want. The 
good life to be lived needs to be more directly questioned in these interventions 
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appreciating the reasons ‘we disagree about climate change’ (Hulme 2009). Climate 
change multiple requires openness, continual intervention, continual questioning and 
potential resistance. This is a qualitatively different debate to figuring out a global 
political solution to best solve climate change singular. 
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